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llnll Tsudamn
Di-tnbulal IXnial ·of-Scn ·ia: (ODoS) 111lacls Ill\: becoming inrn:asingly prcvulcm In lhc
lnlrniCI aod:ay. ,\ DDoS lllUld oJicmpiS 10 pn:•·cna a •·icalm from pro••iding a a:noln
lc•-cl of servia: 1o u~rs. :uW lhr effects of a MJCCC>.l>ful 1111ac~ CIUl range from minor
lncun•·cni~ 10 major linandnl ronsaJucn~"CS. llai~ 11JCSI~ pn:sc:nl~ o nml:l upprooch
for lhc detection of o DDoS nuoct.: callctl Ruaio ·b3>4.'\J SYN Rood Dclcctlon (llSD). RSD
b on lli.Lapth-c llul:lohoW algorilhm and will dyruunh:ally udj~L't lb bcl1:1Yior to acluc•-c
optimal p e r f = in ~ roc.: of ''llJYins truffic ronililio!b. A mcll1odolot;y I'
pll!)Cnlcd which oplimizcs RSD 10 mat.:o:- II mon: gcncnlly ~ultcd for widopn:ud
depiO)'Illi.'nl. :md il~ cffiC:~ty is 1'11.1idalcd through II"DC'C-dri'l:n simulDJion-..
Ncll\'011.: ~wrs IUJI'C ba:n dcl'elopcd fo r muir~ in onlcr 10 provide haniii'Dn: ·lc• cl

pcrfontl:lllcc with Ih-e n~ibiliay of o rrosr.mlnwl•lc W\:hhccturc. Nc111 or!.: Jl~"'" Ill\:
lo.'"lllcd on lbc edge routcrs of a ~ub IICiworL.. ~~ohkh Is ai!>O wl~ RSD h. dcplo)'Cd. 11~
orplic:lbilil)' lmrlcmcnlins RSD on a IICI\I'OJI. Jl~'Dr ls cJplon."-'. a.nd lnitllll n::sull'
fmm lhis in~"CStlgaalon 1111: pn:sc:nlcd.

or

T.\Ul.E OF CONTENTS
I.L~ OF T,\Dl.l~ .................................................................................. \'I

Lin OF F1GURE;S ........................... .......... .......................... .....................,.IJ
<..,l.t\ .l "rnR 1: ll\TilOUUcrtON•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••-. 1
CIL\I'lHt!: UJ\C KGrtOUND 1\NI> REI.i\llill WOlU<S ............................. ..J
2...1 T)'J')CS o.r1)()5 1\ Illttks.. •••••••••••• •••••••• ••
......3
U DIJoS f1c.xxllns: ;\lla.t·ks:.... ...........- •••••••• •••••••••••••••••••- •••.••••••••••••-4
u.t nJ..rMt ;\tl4C'k5.... ......... .................................................. .. 4
2.2..% ltcfl« lor ;\llack.._••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6
2.3 Solut_
lo.ns l.o th.c DIJo.li l'rolllc.m. .............................. ...........................8
l l l t\lt.nck IW"rmtlon tlfld l'r"C'emptfon...........................................S
lll, ,\lt.nc_k Drt«tlon and I:'JitmnJl... ............ ........... ..................9
2.3.!.1 Spooftd II' Add~ UdrdJoo ............................. - 11
2.3, , ~lonltorln;: Trnm~ Cluuuc:Ctristlcs.......................... l3
2.J.3 .\liDck Sou!'nl Trutthack and ldenllOCDIIon.....................-1 S
U N~t"ork r~rs................. ·················-································-IS
!.5 CulTCill Rcsl!Drcb ou llidwork l'rotcSSOrs. ................. ....................17
I • • ••••••••• •••• •••• • • •• t •• • • • • • •••••••

CJL\I'll'll J: llATIO·DASED S\'N FI.OOD Dlm, CTION ................,,. ... ..... 19
l.l S\"N J:J,.)"Jn,::. ,\ttocks........................................ ...............................-19
3..2 llutlo-bastd S\'N Flood IJelKllon (RSO) ............................... ........ 21
3..3 llSD Octa.IIs................ ............................. ................ ............ .... ...-..l..a
l l l \ 'DI')·lng a ... ......... ..... .. .................... .............................-.25
3..12 Va.r ,·ln::,tp•••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ...%6
.3..3.3 \'QJ')·ln~~ ~l..................................................._.....................-26
3~

RSD Tru.lnlnA :\10ill.u lc:. ...................... ............._
........................ _..l6

3.3.5 Oynnrnlcally AtUu..~llnA ~ft ............................................... .. ..2~
CIIAPTER -': RSD 1!\I('LEJ\IE!Io'TATION AND llliSULTS ........................... _"\.\
.a.t DEC sltr results.... .... ........ .... ................................................ .................36
4.1 LOI.., sllr rcsull1............................................................................. .....39
.s.J Disttls:slon.. ........... _., ......................... .......................................... ...............--10
-l..l.l S\'N.cJog Compnri:soo. ..... .................................................. ....10

CIL\PTER S: ,\I'('U C.\UILIT\' OF RSD TO N~IWORK l'ltO CI.iSSORS...... - •13
s.t SlnwlA.tor... .... ............. ......................................................................aJ
5..llmpl~me:ntatlun Results ... .. ..................................... ............. ..................a.s

CIL\PI"ER 6: CONCLUSION...........,...................... ................. ... .......... ..........-47
6..1 . . .ulum \\'ork.................. . ...................................... .............. , •• _48
ll~~~ ..................................... ............ ...................... .............. ...........J)()

I.ISTOFTADU!S
Tahir 1: Em.t:oplts or C'OmiOOn DlloS ft:O mor DllAth..................... ...............a
T ahlt l: Saa:unztr)' or tna.llk lrDn:s UlCd In dmu:l:uJoas.. ................................ ..Jl
Tahir l: Opthn:IJ \'Dlua ror RSD ror dllrtrl'nllnas................. ................... ....J.a

LIST 01~ FIGURES
·~~ 1: 1\ l)1Jlml O()o!; Alltltk orlwork ................................................... ...S
I:'IJ:U~ 2: •1ow of tl'llflk In a dln:d attack and a ~nrdor olll.lck ••••••••••••••••••••••••7
•l:u~ 3: l'osslblc locutions ror drlrcllonantl nllrrfng mcdumlsm•••••••••••••••••• -10
·~1'¥:' ~: Nt&work pl'tlltCSSOr o.rthlt«ture:s.................................................... l7
RJ:U~ 5.: TCI' 5blrs rornspondlns: to nol'lll4l rnnorciJoo cs14l.IIWuornt nod
lt::~rdn'D. ··-·.•.... -· ........................................................ , .............•......-20
l;"fJ:U~ 6: S\'N nnd S\'N·ACK p:~ckrt rouniS ol DEC ond 1.81-. .......................ll
t~rr 7: F.JTC'ds of\'DI')'IDg tfl 41 DJ!C and LDI................................... ,. ..........lll
1-11:11~ 8: A~ru;r oumbrr of S\'N·ACK puckers obsut·rtlln rncb dJ ror UI~C

TI"Dtr••• -········ ......................................................................................2.9
I:'Jgun- 9: Err«ts ofnU")'lnA.dl on DEC· I and DJ!C·!. .................................- .•.31
1-lgu~ 10: t\\l'riiJ:l' number orS\'N·t\CK p:u:kc!S obsrrvrtlln rnrb &t ror

DEC· I a.nd DEC·:!..................................................................................31
A~~~

II: Rrsulrs from ltSU trnlnln11 p!IIISC! on DEC nnd LBL trncrs............- .. ~

R~'U~ I!: Rcsu!IS rrom ltSU 5lmulatlons (llEC 5ltc)......................................36
A~:~~rr 13: Tndll1: Inlets \vltb nntl 'vltboul nlll.lck lndllc ror OEC·I'KT·I,
DEC·P~I·l..nnd DEC·P""T.J.....•.........•.•....•....•.................•....•.............• ....37
Agurt 14: Con:tp:l.risc:Jn oftrafll.r rates o.t DEC slt~ ........................................ ..38

·'lgu~ IS: Results rrom RSD slmul:atluns (LDL slt~) .................................... -39
Agurr 16: Compari5on of lroffic role at DKC nnd l.DL 5l!cs. ..........................39
f1gurr 17: Intel IXt• 1%00 1\rtbl2C'Clu~.......................................................44
R::urr 18: Ra:ults rrum S.lmulntor.•.••.••••••....••...•.•..•..•.•.•••••...•......•....•...... ..46

CIIAM'F.R 1: INTflODUCTJON
Dcnlnl·of·Scrvh;e (OoS) ouzu:kJ 01111 Dlslribut.ctl DcnW-of·Savlcc (I>DoS) an: lxcomlng
intmiSinsly IIK\'Dirnlln 1hc: lnlc:mc:ltoda)•. A DoS 11ttotk Is MclllUiltlcril.Cll by on o:pllch
11li011Jll by ntllltkm to IIK\'Cllllqplim:uc ustrS of a service from using lh:ll service- (26).

In otiJC:r wonls. a DoS auzu:k nlms 1o diSI'\Ifll
through malicious mcons.

1\

w

nomul oJlCfllllon of on ln1c:me1 stf\itc:

Ulstribulcd DoS nlllltk Is simply a DoS 111tzu:k l.n wldch

multiple: distributed c:omJ!IIlm an: usa! 10 perform 1hc 111111tk. Titc: lmJ13tl of

ti~CSC

ouzu:ks con rongc: from minor lnconvcnlcnca. such o.s slow response from n wc:bsitc:. to
major finondnl c:onscquc:nccs. such as lhe hlshly publicized DoS OJIIltkJ In Fcbnmry of
2000. Titc Iauer altntl•s lllllltted hish·profifc comp:llllcs \\ho rely on lite ln1crnc1 for tiiC'ir
11!\'CIIUC,

Tilt

lndudlng/\nuwm.c:om. E'Tmdc. c:Dn)'. 01111 Yahoo. Most rctc:nlly. Microsoft.

sco Group. and d!C RJAJ\ ltn\'1: been the lllf\,'1:1 or OoS OUIICks.

In the tuSC of llJC

SCO Group. the allllcks C\'cn succ:tc:ded in crippling thdr wcbsi1c.

Dcnlnl or Service o1111tks ouc:mpl to consume: enough of a viclim •s limited n:soiii'C'CS until
no lonGer provide: a ccrtnln lcvd of sm·lcc: to lc:ghlma1c: users. TIICSC

the \'lcllm

Cllll

n:so~

cno be nC:t\\'Ork bal\llwidth. computing t)~lt:i. or opc:rotlng S}"Sic:rn lblD

struc:tun:s f2.J). In order to consuntc thc:sc: n:s:oun:cs. otlllda:rs usc t\\U mclhods: !'ORwun:
o:ploits and Ooodlns nuocb. SoR\\'DII! c.~plolts t11kc: llllvonlllgc: of bugs In 1hc ,;clim's
opc:mlins

S)'51c:rn. 01111

flooding nllllckJ senti o IO'llc runo1m1 oftmmc l.o tll\l \itlim.

While most detected DoS atU!Cks h:n-c been sllO\\n 10 rome from a single so~e [29), a
growing trend Is to utilize multiple

SOurct'S

to send ottod: trn111c. 111is is Clllcd a

Distributed OoS ot!DI:k. ant! tills tlu:sis will com:cnuutc soldy on DDoS flootlins·b4sal
DIIDI:ks.

TIIis tllCSis p=nts a new oppm:~ch for tit.: tlct«tion of DDoS SYN·flood attacks cnllcd
Rlllio·b:iscd SYN Flood Detection (RSD). RSD is o type of Dllapti\-c: thn:sholtl alb'Orilltm
o.rul \\ill dynmnh:olly adjust its behavior to othlc\-c: optimal performance in the faec of

\'DJ")ing uuffic conditions. A methodology is p=ntcd whitb optimiz.:s RSD to make it
mon: gcncroliy suiled for \\itlcspn:ad dcplo)ment. and ils cfficocy is ,-nlidatcd throush
II'DCI:-dri\'Ctl simulations.

Tills thesis will also inn:stil!lltll the opplicobilhy of

implementing RSO on a ruswork processor o.rul will show.

ll~n~ush

simulation. that a

minimal amount of procasing O\l:lhcad Is required to implment RSD.

This tllCSis Is orgnnized os follo\\'5: Chapter 2 (11'0\'itles I=I:ground information on ODoS

nt!DI:ks and network processors os well os cum:nJ I'C5Cllldttn:nds in both an:os. 013J!Icr 3
pn:scnts the RSD algorilltm in detail. along \\ith n methodology t11:11 can be usa! to
optimill! its performance.

Chapter 4 anol)-zcs tlto results oblllincd when an

implcmenllltion of RSD Is \11lldnted lll!lllnst a number of n:al-worh.l lr.lffic tr.Jccs.
Chapter S invcstll!lllts the appllcobilily of implementing RSD on n network JlrnC'CSlm.
wnl Chapt~r 6 pn:s.:nts ~onckulons uluns \\itlt supg~:Stluns ror future work.

2

CIIAI'TER 2: BACKGROUND AND rtF.I.ATED WORKS
This c:hnpter \\ill provide an undc:l'llllllding of difl'crc:nt typc:s of DDoS altllc:ks and lhc:

nu:cb:misms behind their c:fl'c:cti\'Cnc:ss. E."lstlng solulloRJ dun oucmpt to pm'Clll ond
dc:tc:ct DDoS atlllc:ks llfC pn:smkd. olong \\ith 11 background on network processors oruJ
CU1rolt n:sc:on:h in the an:n.
U T)'(ll'.l or DoS Attacks

Dc:nilll ofSc:rvlc:c ouncl:s ouanptto c:oRJuntc mouglt ofo \i ctim's limited rc:soun:cs until
!he victim con no longer pm\i.dc: n c:cnnin lc\'cl of sc:n•ic:c: to lcgitlmntc: users. TIJCSC
~sowtc:S

c:nn be network b:J:ruh,idth. computing C)'des. or Opc:mling

system dnuJ

struc:tun:s 12-'). In onkr to consume: thc:sc rc:sourccs. ottnckcrs use two methods: sofimm:

n

c::" pi oits nrul ood In 11 Dillie: ks.

Atlllc:ks that foll In the sofiwure exploit a~tc:gof)' t)lllc:oll)• tnkc: od\'lllltagc: of bugs In the
\'ittim's opc:rDling system. By lllkingnd\111ltagc of these buss. Dllllc:kcrs con SIICCCC'd in
cr.ultlng or disabling the victim \\ith 11 small number of p;lCkcts. An aumplc oftllis t~'Jll:
of attack is the "plng-of·dcath" uttnck )28) wltlch sends 1111 at~c:l)• lnrgc: ICMI' c:cho
packet to tlu: victim und causes some opc:rD!ins systems 10 crush,

~boot.

or f=.

Another c.wnph: Is the: Ml...4nu auack )17) which sends n TCP SYN p3ckc:t conlllinins
tire victim's II' llll the soura: and dc:stln:nlon addtl:ss. then:by c.auslng an infinite loop in
the protocol stack )24). Titc:s.: I)'JICS of attacks c:nn be mldsated lltrougl1 tlu: usc of
palc:hc:s nrul OS u(lll.otc:s, 1111d tltc:lr p~\'lllmcc lw dc:c:llned llll users lta\'C bc:comc: bcnc:r
.about updating und protc:c:tlng tlu:lr 5)-sll:ms.

3

A fill' more wldcsprtmi ond dllngcrotU IYJIC of attack Is o noodins·'-cd OUAck Ill J.
Flooding lllllltks send

0

hugo

llll\DUOI

s:uuralion or n:soum: sntumtion

liS

or lnlffic 10

1111:

\•lclim, n:suhlng in bandwidtb

tlu: victim attcmpiJ 10 c.lcDI will1 the llllffic. 1k

p:ackcts lli'C typically scnc:nllcd to lllkc llll\'lllllaGC or lliC \\'11)' a victim dcllis "ith cntAin
(ll'Otoculs.

M

Is the tllSc with SYN 0001llng 1161 which aploits TCP's lhra:·"-:JY

hantlsful.kc: mccbanlfl11. Otltc:r cxan1plc:s inclwlc lllllleb llllll usc TCP pxlrC1• "ilh no
llAgs set (TCP NULL attack), TCI' p;~Ckei.S 1\ilh oil Oap set (X111:1S Ollllck).lllld p:ldds
wllh a non'1:xll1cnt II' (ll'Ot.ocol number 12-IJ. In all oftlu:se C:liSC$. tile \'iclim alloc:ncs
rcsoun:I:S to handle l:lll:h p:ackct. and the lhccr number of p.xkcu CIMCS the \·lctim

10

c;nuh.

2.2 DDoS FloodlnJ: t\Uotks
As mentioned I!Cfon:. a DOoS anock utlll~ mulllplc bruu on the intc:rnct to send a brJ;c

volume or tmffic to a victim. In the hopes of crippling h or making it un:l\'llilablc. In
sencml, th~n: on: 1\\'0 types or lloodlng at !liCks: cllrc:ctlllllleks and rc:Occtor nttacks 1II).

2.2.1 Dlrnt Atlodu
/1. cllrc:ct atlllek Is when on attacker nmmgc::s to ha\'c a llii'QC number of packcu

cllrc:c!ly to a vlc:tlm. TI1csc p:ackcts cnn be gcncl'lltcd snlcl)' by

!l~e

scn1

otlllc:kc:r or. more

commonly, threugl1 o ODoS otlllek network of com(ll'Omiscd hosu. Such o nct\\'ork is
composed of 01c or mon: llllnddng hosts which control some number of IMSicrs. or
controllc111. lln:sc 111:1Stcrs In tum control o lofb>c: number of zombies. or cLxmons (figure:

I) wWch lli'C the entitles !lUll octu:tll)' 5end the otllltk ll'llffic: to the \ictim. AttDCking hosts
origlnDtc tlte oll.cck scqucmcc by notifYing the mostcrs who tbc:n llUirul:1 the: zombies 10

begin smiling o.lllll:k parkc:IS. Alllll:kcrs \\illl)'l'ltolly compromise 11/llllllltking host flRl.

whkh Is lhm used to ICII/l for olhcr vulnmblc hosiJ In onlcr to lns10ll SJ!CCIIic DDoS

mnster ond ZQmble progroms.

TO' !1"\1\.IOil',l'lll'CCW ..rw II' 14' n~~un
....a,qwo~co~~

Figure 1: A C)'Jlltal DDoS DllliCk nrllvork crrom IIIII

Scnlns up o DDoS o.llnck ~1\\'0rk gives the ollDcker lhe! od\'IIIIIOgc of onon)mhy (since
parkctsare being gmcnue!d by other lcgilhlllllc. nlbcil c:ompromlscd. h0$U) 1111d inCTC:liSC\l

fitqlOwcr due to !he J1055lbllhy of C:.'(JlODtnllnl growth wing tl1c mnstcr·ZQmbie model A
munbc:r of tools are fm:ly n\'llllllblc on the

lnte~n~:l

to nld in ronstructing

lll1

nUDCk

network nod launching n DDoS niiOtk, Including Trinoo, Tribe Flood Nci\\'Ork 2000.Illld
StacbeldrnlU I II J. For 0 dciOIIC!d description or some or tllcsc loots lllld how 1.0 setup an
o.110ck network.~ (29).

s

Mosl din:d Ql1!ltb usr rommnn lnlcmcl pro'tocol J1.1Ckcu. sudJ as TCI'. UDP. and

lO.tP. In IlK- CIISC of TCP. a ropubr auxk is a SYN flooding Olllll:k IIIli 16] ubm a
lmge ~ ofTCP SYN ~ 111C KDtto a victim using a S]100fcd soum: II' ldcln:ss
in IlK-

f'Xkct.

lf the \idim is liaming for conru:clloo

~a~ucsu.

il wilt respond

~\iLh

a

mnnhcr of SYN-ACK pxkl:u and "ill then \\1lil fo.r a rc:spoosc. llowcver, siotc tbc

orisimJ TCP S\'N pxl:ru b.:m: S)100fcd SOUIC'C 11' addn:s.scs. lhcsc S\'N-ACK ~cts

brt;c nnmhcr of TCI' S)'N J1.1Ckcts ''ill cn::w: a llugc: number of h.31f-opcn cnnnections

on IlK- \il:lim.. quickly c:onsuming

I1:SOliTCCS

and ,m'Cllllng the victim from

DCCCJ~ting

lq;ilim:ll.l: c:oancaious or. in the "'01'51 asc. aushinglhc: \i c:tim. UDP and ICMI' p;lCkc:ts

cm ;ilia b: used i.D a simib.r fashian to O\'Cf\\'bdm !be: \iaim by cwsing tbe victim lo
sc:od :s brt;c rmmhc:r ofUDP or ICMI' cdJO n."JliJ' n::sponsc: p:idcLS 10 fllkc: II' lllldn:sscs.

good Ill bidiQg lhc idmlity of the annc!,;er or incmlsing tbc distribution of anlli!Dd f30J.

such liS Ttl' S\'N p:ldru (S\'N-ACK response) or 10.11' c:cbo ICq1l&5l J13tkcLS (ICMP

IP address. CliiSiog IlK- rdlcctors 10 sc:od the n:5JlOliSC p;ld:cLS to the \ic:Jim (flgun: 2o).

.

In tbis "-uy. a Wp: liiDOIIIIl of lr.l.ffic: is unkoowiasJy gcoeratcd by tbc: rc:Oc:ctors and is
t:ap:la:llll !be \ictim.. Oooding the \idim' s link..

6

A

fA

.

"ICP.~'S.IOII'. IW

R

...._

"'iao ... ....,_., ...

_...

R

I

IO'Mo'S. IC\IJ', IIDPc••a·,~

.. dw

-..lroddtn>J

1 CI'S\,..\0..

1C:r ll!oT,IOlJ',
l 111'-

v
Ftpftl: F1P' of tnt'& 1a a din:c1attack(11) aad II ftO~lor attack (b}. .Entity A
rqm:smbl the altadla, V b lhnktlm, R b lhc ftfk.ctor (from II If)

RdlCCIOr

gUtJrk• ~uin: ~

Allll05I ~·

iD

11

use or p-csclcdel rclkclnrs and specific DUDCI.:

rroux:ot whidJ employs an OUlotnlllil: fi!Sl!OMc m«banism am k

rcl1cctor """"'"

p3CI.:c\S.

c:xploitctl

In addition to TCP SYN p.ttl.:cts and ICMP echo p:lcl;cu

as

mc1ni..ncd abo\-c. ICMP c:nvr mcss:Jgcs 4lld DNS queries c::ut be used. For c:xan1plc.
lllllld.; piCkcu uith i.n\"alid dcstinlltion

IIIII'CliCimblc-

mCWlj;CS

10

a

pons \\'ould cuusr a rcl1~10r to send ICMP pon

\irtim. Abo. DNS C1lll be cxrloitcd to lllkc a'h1llllllgl: or

b;md\\idl!J lllllplifianion wbae a sm:all number or Dllllrl.: packets (DNS n:cursh-e qumcs)

em nisger 1m1:tt p:ldcts iD tcspot& (DNS rq~lics) Il l). Table I SUllllllll.rizcs some
CCI1818 1MQI

reftc:ctor nonrks

rdlmor :rn!!C'n are

=

difficult 10 idcotify. Filtering hued on spooraJ IP lllldrascs or

tullle-basa1 infCJn113tigu btanncs much less effecti\-c. In addition. reflector o11111:1:s C4Jl

k man: distributcd llcn cfmxt nuacl.:s since a.tllll:kcrs do not need to compromise hosu.
lnstcnd they can util.izc ~ many lesitimllle rcOec10n across the lntanet.

7

'1)-pc

or Auatk

s-rr
SYNn-IID&
JIST
IOIP Doadia:

l'llc:Lcu ont by natud.u to a rrlk-tlot
(•ltll a \lnlm'• addrcu •• tbr - m

l'ad.ttl .at b)· tbr rtllcrtur to
lbr 'letha Ill ,...IIOD"'

IIJldJ'I'U\
ICMP ccbo qucria to a .ubac1-d.ircaN

ICMP C'd10 rq~Jico

brcQdcul~

TCP S'I'N px\ru to publk Tel' ocnu.tc.;11rbocn-cnl
to IIOIIllitmloa TCP-,;o;u
TC'P
ICMP
qucria (!Dually rdao qucric'l)
•
• UDP pxLcts 10 noalb!tolnJ UDI'

•
DSS rrplylloodiq

rou

II' pxLcu "''.b lool' 1TL \~ua

I DNS tromnh-c) qucria to DNS.......,..

TCP SYN·ACK pxLcu
TCI'RST
ICMP rq~lia (usually
ccbo l'<'plia)
• ICMP ron untcldubk

•
•

~

ICMP limo cu=laJ

m:&:U.1•o
DNS rqillcs !<Du:ill)' 111ucb

ll=DNS

""'ct

Toblr 1: Eumpl~ or common DOllS nOt't'tor-DIIntks (rrom Ill J)

2.3 SaluUom to lbr DOllS Probltm
As DDoS ottod:s b«omc more

pti:\'Dicnl Dlld more co.slly, till: need for solutluns

becomes villll. G1:ncnl1Jy SJ)e31.i ng. ~here ore lhm: oppi'D3clu:s IOII'IInl5 the mitl(lllllon of

DDoS anliCks: llllliCk pn:I'Clllion Dlld pm:mption (prior to~ nuad:).lltiD.Ck detection wul
filtering (during the llllllCk}. wu1 11ttack soum: tmccbad: WJd ldcntilirotlon (nflc:r the

IUI.:ICk)( II).
2.3.1 ,\ttack Pn:veaUon llllll Pl'ftmptlon

All!ld: Jlfi:\'C1JUon and prccmption is probably the most difficult of the thm:

mili~on

tt:dllliqucs. While this rqll'CSCn\S the first line of defense: ogo.inst ODoS llltoc:n the cost·

benefit nuio Is extremely higl1 for

U5Cl'S

who implcmmt

th~

teclmlques. Attotk

pm-enlion requires the coopcrution of indi1idual hosts to protect tbdr S)'Stcms from
amtributiog to n DDoS IIIID.Ck. These lndhidunl hnsts am usc monitoring tools WJd

111llll:.k sigtllllun:s to 5aUJ for nttod: llllflic: or kno1111 nttnck musngc:s sent bc:tll'l:cn nwters
mJd zombies. They am also toJ,;c the

lltCCSSD.r)'

8

StCJl.' to protect their s)-stcms from

becoming c:ompromlsaliUid Infected \\ilh o DDoS mmblc JIIVCCSS. IIO\\-c\'1:1, mostlllfllc
lSI's IUid cnkTprlse nrtworks simply do not hove the incentives to employ du:se difficult
c:ountcrmcnsun:s (Ill. Additionally. since the ntlllck truffic: Is h.lshJy distributed amonS$1
lite soun:cs. the omoun1 or nliOA:k truffle Is ~tmm:ly low In rclol.lon to lcgitlll1ll1C llllffit.
All of litis combines to make llllllck rm·cntion IUid preemption nt !lac: soun:.:s o:xlii:mCiy
trid;y.

2.3.2 Alluk Ddcc:tlon and Filtering
A sc:cond Of111rom:h 10\\Uflb DDoS Illlack mitigation Is lllllU:k dc:tcctio n IUid filtering. This
approach llltcmpu to ldcntlf)• nn ong.oing DDoS otllldc nnd then crnrloys llltcrs to block
the otllltk lmffic before It con rcoch the out5!.lc net\\lllk.

A kc:y c:onsidc:rutlon when dealing with ounc:k detection Is lite plntcmmt of tlu: detection
nnd flltcring mechonism in the network. Since DDoS otllltks lllll highly distributN. t1u:
nnwunt of attock unffic storU out n:l:ui\·cly low ot the soun:e nct\\urks nnd becomes
lncrcoslngly lll!grcgtllcd u.s It gets closer to lite \'lctim ·s oct\\urk. Titcn:forc. tllc closer tJu:
detection mc:clUIIIlsm Is to the victim's oct\\Urk. the Mc:nsicr" it is to successfully dctcc:t nn
llltock. In c:ooiiiiSt. tbe c:lo.scr the detection meclwnlsm Is to the soun:c

OCI\\'Orb,

tlu:

h:udcr It Is to detect nn ntllltk. In the Iauer cose. lhc: mtl.> of lllllltk truffie to lcgitirruue
llllffic Is

\~1')'

low. moldng detection difficult compaT\'\1 to detection 111 lhe \ictim •s

network where the rutlo Is very high.

Unfonunatdy. lite ciTcc:th-cncss of detection nnd filtc:ring ls nJso dcrcndmt on the
locntlon of tile mechnnlsm nnd Is ill rcc:tl)' related to tho difficulty of detection. Oy the

9

lime 1111 IIIIDtk IW ba:n tlctcxtalal the victim's ncll\1llk. LIJC (IIC()ming bml~~oidlh las

lllmldy ba:n cloggctl by the llltuck f13Ckcts Wid the llltod;m M\'\l •"UCCUdcd in

•

pl'l:\'l:lltlnglc:ghlnuuc users from accc:ssingthc: victim.

TI~c:

only rcnl benefit t.o cktcc:tian

Dl IIIC vi~thu n~lWOik Is""' rn:wc:nllon of II ···lctlm mull due lo n:soun:c Slllo'lJtion

auock JI3Ckc:IS ore droppold

befo~

em-

rcnchlna lhe victim). 'J'hcrefore. It \\ould be much

more dfcctl\-.: to dctcxt an IIIIDCk nt:lll' lite soum: nct\\'ork llJid drop the 1111111:k pxJa:u

before they enlcr lite Internet. thc:rcby 1111ving lntcmct rc:sourcc:t Wid prn'1:llling
bandwidth stlii'\'Jtlon at the victim's network. llowc\'er. ns SUited abcm:. dcll:Ction is

mon: difficult ns \\'I! mo\·e cloKT to Lite soun:c net\\1ltks. Tbcn:ln lies II~~: problcm-.u u~
move

0\\1IY

from the victim· s network. the cffccth'CDCSS of dct«tlon and nltcring

incrcnses..o.s tlocs tl1e difficulty. Figure 3 summ.:uizc:s tlti5 n:lation.ship between ddCClion
cffccti\'CDC:SS and difficulty.

I Anm:kTmmc

VICTIM

ElT«!i\mc:u .-1
Oit11cull)•lnata>U

FIJtUI'l.l3. roulblc loallans for d~IIICtlan and fllltrinp mcthanhm

~0

~ms liko a rchuJ,·cly simple solution to the DDoS problem. actuol lmpleJIIC1lUI1lon

Is

dlffieult. In mnny ltlfl:e-scnle net\\'orb,IJtc O\<tthead of inspecting e\'1:1)' oUigoins p;,ckc1
for soutte oddrc:ss vnlldily I• lnfcnslblc. Wldcspmul dcflloymcnt \\1luld alm ~uirc the
coopcmllon from oil lSI'• and nct\\11tk odmln!Wntors. who

5«

llule benefit in

lmrlcmmllns sw:b 1111 l:llpcnsive feoturc In lhcir t'dge roukn.

Other solutions thntlll'C oucmpt to Identify spoofed truflic include iSAVI'! [221(19llll!d
Soutte II' Addres.s Monitoring (SIMI [12JII3J. iSAVI'! lllkmpts to detect spoofed IP
oddrcsses on routera by building tables or incoming lru.erfaccs and \'lllid source II'
oddrasc:s. The lnformalion contained In tlu::5e
U$lng !SAVE JliOtocol

OICS$1GCS

and

•~bles

lll'C ~~led

an: then slmn:d belwccn

ro~~~cn

to filler out spoofed lnlffic.

An

implementation of the ISA Vfi protocol lw bc-c:n dcmonslnltcd on the Intel LXP 111111 ba:s
bc-c:n shO\m to minimally lmp:K:t routing pcrfoi'I'IUIIlCC.

Sl~t

on the other lmnd. uses off-

line uninJns to build II' Addrc:ss Oatalwcs (lADs) which contain \'lllld II' addrc:uei KCO
at a network device:. In the detection llllll learning plulsc. the amount of new IP oddrcsscs
obscn'Cd is modeled uslns a change dctcctlon algorithm called

Cumulllth~

SIDD

algorithm [ 16)[37J. An anock Is detected whm the change-point \Wblc crosses socr
thn:shold. S!M has bc-c:n aho\\11 to cO'ccth"CI)' idmtll)· DDoS llllDCks at the

~

nctwork uslngthla scheme [Ill.

Park ct. of. [IS) talce a dlffcR!Dt opproac~ and Ill tempt to eliminAte spoofed II' llddn:ssa
through the

U$C

of route-based distributed jWkct flltcrlng (OPF). DPF usc:s

rou~

Information at network devices to dctmnlnc If a J1.1cl:ctanhinglll 11 router Is \ulld \\ilb

12

tesp«1 10 ha soun:c and dcslbmllon IP lldWus fichb. Perk clAims llul if only Jr_. or

lllllonomous aystmu

imrl~nt

DPJI on thdr bonler rou1er1. a "ayneJBJ51ic fillering

eiTttl Is lttltlc\'al whose collcxth-c nltcring oction proxth'Cly JII'C\'aiU spoofed lP f~A'I

from n:ncltlns otlu:r autonomOUJ S)'lltii\J In tl~e filii plaa:" I IS( .

Jln cL ol. 12:11 also tol!.c a Wliquc aJirn-b by fihcrins pao;kct.t bouaJ un

(hor-count) In IP

~~~td:eu.

~

Tn fldd

Till! 11lgorilbm lllllilllllina a h:u.b table CODWoing lllldn:n

prdlxcs 1llllppcd to hopocounu and COI11JlWtS incomingiP Jl3C.kets opimt lhialAhle. Jlop

Count Flllc:rins's (JICFI eiTcd\'c:ncu relies on tl~e IWWllption 111:11 auockrn fn:qucml)'
choose some Dibill"'Uy \'nlue Ill plaa! In them. field \\ben gencmting anxJ.. pxlru

and tiU!SC: llllCkeu witl1 "in\'nlilllTL fields can be Cl!ily idcmificd. 1'be olllbon Ill\~
Implemented the scheme In tl:ac: Unux kernel and

lm\'C

s.hlmn o ~- IUCCCii:l r.:dc •ilh

"liulc collatcml tllunagc" (23).
:Z.J.2.11\tonltorlng Tn~ffic Cban~ctrrbtla
1'hc second group or solutions uses tr.lffic mmlitoring and tr.lffic cb:a:xtaUtics

to

Identify DDoS nnncks J38J[l?J. 0·\Vt\RD ( 181(211 Is lklcctlon IJICChmli1m t1ut t.
rtnced D1 tlte soun:c m:twork IIJld Identifies anxk ll0\\'1 by monitoring tu~w:ry trafrJC
flows bet\\"CCn lite network and the ~ of tl11: llllmleL It uo:U b)' looldna for sips of
communltatlon difficulties and by comJWins obsm'Cd tr.lffic 5t"tiPics "ith prakf~
models of nonnnl tr.lffic. \Vhc1111 f10$51"blc DDoS 11IIott is idcntlflcd. 0-Wt\RD ~
by rutc-llmltlnglhc flow whld1 can then confirm or rclbtlltbc cxUlcnC'C of an anad:.

I

Oil cl. ol. [I-ll proJIOSCS a schl:lnc: CAlled MULTOI'S which utlliza o unique ~lib: cbs~
IIIUCIUI'Il 1o dUilllclerlzc unffic: chnnu:tcrisrlcs on o nc:I"'Ofk dcviee.

h looks for

Inconsistencies bd\\'mllr.'lffic golngiO and from spcc:ific II' addrcsxs. Sp:clfially, if a
c;cruln p;u:kcl rule lnwcllng 10 a boSI Is higha lh3n the n:tuming pxkc1 r:dc.. it is

ossumcd lh:ll the destination hose

0111)'

be under lllllld; ond the outgoing tnalfte is lhcn

nuc-limhcd. llowcvcr. OlllnYflows on thc: lnlmtct on: llS)llllllCiric. "Web \\ould incn;uc
tlte false pcuhl\'1' nuc: of this scl~m~c [12).

Wong cL ol. [421 have proposed a mcclunlsm 10 dcta:t SYN floods Ill the SOIII'Ce CIC:llllori:
c:ollro SYN-dog. lltc SYN-dog mechanism ls loc:ucd on olctf router ond moniton the
diiTcrcncc bel\\'ml lhc: number or SYN and SYN-ACK pxkc:U.. Its c:ITCdh'CDCU is

based on ll~e: slrong rorrellltloo bcl\\'ml SYN and SYN·1\CK

~

in o OOI111AI TCP

session. Under nonlUil c:ondilioJU. o SYN p:xkc:t \\ill be occompmial by a

~~~

SYN·ACK during o TCI' connection a-tup. llo\\'e''C'f. during a SYN flooding anx\
huge numbers of SYN packets \\ilh spoofed II' lllldmJcs on: sau 10

A

,;c:tim.. 1lili

pm~

SYN·ACK pukc:t.s from n:tuming 10 the

bc:t\\'CCJI

SYN onil SYN·ACK ~kcu am be obscn'l:d. S\'N-dog 'm'll this difTc:rc:D~:C

50UI't'e

nc:t\\ork. and

A

dilaq\mC)

bccwcm SYN ond SYN·ACK J~Xkc:ts os a •illltloiW)'. ergodic random I"OU!SJ-[41). ond
models II

OJ

n Scqucnliol Change Dclccllon [46) problem. SYN-dog llOm\llin:s the

diiTercncc using an atlmatro number or SYiN·ACKs and then uses the oon·)W'llllldric

Cumulllth"C Sum (CUSUM) method (47)to lndiclllc pcu:slblc: l!lt&lcl;·li\:c traffic. f<lr a
clctollro description of tire SYN-dog olgorillun.scc (42).

I~

..

•

Detecting DDoS otllll:ks Ls o tlllllcuh wk. cspecilllly whtn the go:~l iJ to detect OIIIU:k
trnfllc

111 cl~

to the soum:

115

possible. Solutions must be easy to implc:ment

ISPs md network odmlnlstnuora \\ill t'l11bnJce enrorccment

wbll~

10

llw

IIUlinUI!ning cffccth'C

dclctllon ond low flll5c-!'O'ith'C rule~ HOJ. R~h Into detection and flltcring is IIlli
being done. ond nO\'CI solullonJ on: still being proposal.
2.3.3 Allack Source Traceback 111111 hlcntffic1Uion

AUDd

SOIUI:C

IJ'Occl=k. or IP tl'lll:cb:lck. Is on ofu:r·the-fllt1 sollllion to the DDoS

problem. llnllcmpiS to Identify, or tmcc, the origin of otUJck patkt'IS In onlcr 10 lllkc
fwurc ocllon against l111: a.ttock.cr (or compromised mochlnc). UnfottW14tcly. it is
Infeasible to usc IP truccbnck to stop on ongoing DDoS ntllll:k IIIJ. IP troccb.:lck
solutions cnnnnt olwoys lrotc Jl3CUIS beyond o lln:wall or n NAT proxy. :md h is useless
ognirut DDoS reOcciOr

olt~ks

devices on lh.e lruemtt.

:!.lnn1 the J'lo'l'litla on: mmlng from

N~"Utbcless.

lcgititru~u: llCl\lmk

IP ti'OC'Cb:ltk could be useful In some casa to

IdentifY a:rtnln otl.lltkcn. allowing law enfom:meru

ogencle~

w lllke 111:\lon. l'or

11

detailed aurvey on tile Illite ofiP lrDCCbntk. see (41J.
2.4 Network ProtuSOn

In any nct\\llrk lnfl1lSlrUcturc. routcra Jllay o key rule b)• l'roviulng line-speed pxlct
procc5Jing while supponlng cenoln fcntun:s Including If' forwmdlng. qunlily or SCT\i ee
(QoS), and vlnunl prl\'lltc networks. Many or'lhesc: fClllun:s go be)'Ond o slm(llt' routint;
1.11ble lookup oml n:qulm dCCfl, &l.lltdbl p;itkel processtng. The current trend In DC.'<I·
gencrollon

IICI\\'OIU

is to mlgroto these fClllllrCS t.owonls lilC edges or SCT\it'C l'fO\idcr

networks and 11\\'D)' from the core routers. allowing the cure to efficiently handle the high·
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~ S\\ilthing or lllf'llC

ll'llffic DQSJ"ClJlll"- A. 0 rcsull. Ll~m Is 0 need for Oc:xlbllity D1

the edge ro\lkrs as well as high pcrfolllUIIltO to handle fi3CkcU D1 line·JpCCd. Ndlo\'Ofk
procuso11 (NP:s) have been dc\'CIDJICd to add!uJ thb issue.

Tlilll.idonally, lwdwo.n:·bllsc:d dcsillJI lw focusc:d on

~

use or AJ!Jilir;ation-Spcdfi~

lntr:gnnc:d Cimllts (ASICs) to pcrfonn most or lhc proc:csslng IDIId. llo\\'C\'CT, ~ long
hnrdwnn: dc\-r:lopmr:nt cycle arul

th~ i~k

of rq~rognunrnnblllty of lhcse ASICs soon

bc:amc llll Issue. cspeclnll)' \\ith the nml for nc:xlbllity in UU! rapidly t\'01\ing llCIUlltk
~ulpmrmtllllttkct

(1). Offi0411ing the proecsslng 10411 to

11

gc:nnul·ptJJJXlSC JliOCCSSQl'

(OPI') snvc W:signe11 plenty of Ocxibllhy, but l1111 pcrfolllUillal of tl!eSC OPP' s ''us

inadeq1111tc. Acconllngly. network piOIXSSOrs \\'1:11: ~-clop:d to pro\i dc am Ocxibility of
o prognunmoblc nrchhccturc \\itb pcrfortn311CC oppro:tthing th:ll of o lmnlw;rrc-twcd
solution.

Typically. network processors consist of o so:t of prognunmnblc: J'IIOC:CS)Ors tl1:1t nrc
optimized for packet p!OCCS!Ing. Tiu:y usll:l)ly 00\'0 specific Instruction so:ts \\bicll allow
for c:fficlr:nt plltkcl handling. along \\llh speclollz.c:d coprocessors to om03d common
pto«SSing WkJ such as Iallie lookUJU or checksum (OmpUlJIIlons. Dc:couse nctwod:
ptoces5011 m\l!t

o~tc

under strict pcrformllllcc n:qulrcmcnts. tile entire design of the

network l'fOCCSSot (execution cnvlronntrmt. memory,

l&:lrd\\1111:

ruc:bltc:cturc, etc.) has been optlntlzed for hlgh·spcc:d J13ckct proc:csslng.
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OtUicraton.. bus

Ncm'Ork processor =hitcclurc:s fnll Into one of two mockiJ: Rrinl or p31111Jcl. In the
smal mOikl (lJIJUR' 4o), aKh con: executes a mulll SCIIffiml of the d4m·palh code on
C\"CfY p:ltka bcfon: scrnllng it nlons to the next coro for funher processing. In the

parallel model (IJgun: 4b). a numba of llCIWVTk

JII'II«!SSOI

con:s an: pn:scnl wid1in IJJC

Nl', ond each con: c.'Cccutc:s the cntln: cloto·pall• code on a Jingle packet. The Intel IXP

1111:hhmun: (49) Is based on the smnl (plpcllnc:d) 1111:bltcctun: and ll1c IDM PowcrNP (6]
is based on the parnllcl model.

Pacbla

PIICbtl

(a) Sculal modal
Flgu~ 4:

(b) PID1IIIal modal

Ncrwork processor on:blcectora (from Ill J)

2.5 Ca~nl RcmJrch an Ncln·ork Procmon

Mosl of the ntii\'Ork rrocessor n:sc:m:h toclay Is being dont mlns the lntd lXI'
an:bltcctun:. spcclllcnlly the Intel JXP 1200 (101. Most of this n:scan:h c::cplores IJ.e
pcrfortrulllcc and fcMlblllt)' ofponlng c:dsllngsoRwtm... I'WCII muter 1\mc:liorulily (QoS.
DIITScn•, cntr)'jltlonldccr)'Jitlon, VPN, etc.) onto a nawork processor. For c.umplc. Un
et. al. (71 hns lmplc:menttd DIITScrv on tin! IXP 1200 11ith the aim of ldmtll)ing

boul=ks \\itbln ll1c IXP 1111:llltcclun: ond ll1c OIITScrv alsorilhm. The: 11111hots found
lluuti~Cir lmplcmenlnllon could suppon Pcr-llop Fom1IJ'IIlng Oclllllior (I'IID)
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l1llllldngln

DliTII:I'V ot on o~gotallhtoushJ!Ut of 568kbJU, wilh II~~: IIID.in botllcnca being the:

shored memory bct\\'MI the mlaocnslnc:s (DRAMj.

Bums cl. oi. IBJimplcmcnts Olldrc:ss llUIITOilCC on the IXP 1200 using the ISAVE protocol
(22) ond shows thot the router sufTm lhllc
lidded

functlon:~llty.

Spnlink rt. ol.

llJISJ

10

no pnfomunce dcgnulation due

ID

the

rrovl&lea an IIHiquh 4113l)'lis of tmic II'

t'orwnnllng furn:tlonollty on the lXI' 1200 ond condudes 11101 It am CISily I'JSl•in line

speeds for 8 x 100 Mbp.s Et11=1 pons, IC11\•inglll1lple JIIOCessiug cydes for odditioml
p:~Ckct

pruc:c:sslng. Simllllr lo Lin el. ol. (7J. the perfornwl(C bonlmcck wzu io the

DRAM. and lhe authors esllmote 111111 o 26o/e Un)1111\'Cmcnl in line-speed J•occssing is

possible \\il11 fosla memory.

IIIW tt. ol. (II dbeusscs l11c suitability of network JUOCC:SSO(I for

-q~D~it)~f-scnicr

(octl\'C queue ll1Dilllgcmmt and traffic engineering), balder rroccsslng tGI'RS IUDDcling
pmlocol). lnlclilgml forwonllns (lolld·b:ll11ndng \\ilhout !low dlsniJilion).

~ylolld

procc:ssing (active ne1works code lnlcrpn:llltlon and Just·in·timc compibtion). lltld
protocol stw:k tcrmlnnllon (SCTI'r

IIJ. Still othc:r an::n of = c h lnclulk QoS (9),

octi\'C networks [ 101. p!ltket clossifitotlon [I OJ, ond \'llriom lo)tt4 oppliCitions 5uch u
web cochlns. lood·oolonc:ing. ond media stn:omlng 11 OJ.
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CIIAPTERJ: RATIO.DASED S\'N FLOOD DETECTION
nlis ~«tion will rrovide on c.'!fllonllllon of SYN floocllng. o common ODoS onnck, and
\\ill also dculll o proposal solution. dubbed nulo-bakd SYN flood ddl:tlion (RSO). II
\\ill also lnttoduc-e o mcthodoiDS)' for oplimlzlns RSO based on lrllffic: J1o1Uemt of
~lfi' networks.

3.1 SYN Floodinlt ;\llockl

A SYN floodlns Dllllek Is so llllltiCd due to Its USIIQC: ofTCJI SYN p:~Ckc:ts os all~~tk 1r11ffic.
SYN floodins atl!l¢ks fall Into lhc floodlns·bnsc:d DIUU:k cDicgory lllUI lun-c beumc a
popular WCIIJIOn for OOoS llttllckm. In fact. It lw been slwwn lhDI more tlun ~~ or
DOoS attllw U5C Tcr•. lllUI of these.. SYN floods ore the most pm-nlmtt)-pc: of lltU1c:k

(44 ).

SYN floodlng Dltlleks Ulke advnntllgc ofTCI''s thrcc·wny h3nds!W:e m«lmnlsm In onJcr
to

cxhniiSt

o victim's n:soum:s. In o nonnal TCP session. a senl!r \\ill listcn for

lnc:oming SYN rcquc:slS on 11 w~ll·kno\\n port. Once o connc:c:llon request c:omc:s In from
o client. lhc sc:nl!r will respond wltb a SYN·ACK f!o1Ckc:t lllUI \\ill c:slllblish a
c:o~llon, Ona~

~f-opcn

the scr\-cr recel\~ the ACK from the ellen!. the tlUC~:-\\11)' ~

Is complete and tl1c session c:an proem! (FigureS).
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In 11 SYN flooding lllllltk. 11 large nwnba of S)100fcd SYN (liltkc:ts \\iCh fa.lsc soum: II'
odd~= III'C sent

to the victim's TCP llstcnlns port. For e~~ch SYN pilckct. the \ictlm

,,;u n:sJIOIId \\ith SYN-ACK p:u:kctond \viii cstobllsl111 bnlf·opcn connection. llowc\"1:1,
since the sourec lP ~ \\liS spoofed. these SYN-ACK p:u:kciS ,,;u be sent to the
spoofed IP addrl:B ond will (~bly) be lost somewhm: In the ln1m1et.

nu~

\ictim.

meanwhile. \\ill continue to keep the hulf·opcn coMectlon III:U\l! for 11 period up to the
TCP connection timeout ond

,,;u not tiii$C the conncttion until two mon: SYN·ACK

n:IJUnsmisslons lun"t! failed. This period of time l)"JIIc:nlly las15 7S m:orul.s (42J. Sintt
the \-ictim only flu 11 limited amount of mcmoJ)• to stnn: t1101: hulf-open conncctlons. o
large nii!Dber of spoofed SYN p~~~:kc:ts \\ill quickly fill up the queue nnd \\ill prt:\"t!DI the

victim from s=ic:Ias lcgltlmliiC cannectlon requests.
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..
1.2 Ratl.o·baard SVN Flo.otl Drtmlon (RSD)

SI.11111M to lhc SYN-dog solution ptoposcd by WMg ct. ol. (421. n11lo-bascd SYN flood
detection (RSD) Dims to detect SYN noods at the source nctworkJ by monitoring the
dlsacp:mc;y bc:I\\'CCII SYN ond SYN·ACK patkcts ol the edge router connecting o Slub

lldwork 10 the lntcmc:L Jlowa-a-, RSD uses lUI odapth-e threshold b3sed algorithm 10
ck1a:t an l1114tk inslc:od ofo cumuloth.-o lllllllllgorilhm,ns In (42). TIJC I\ICCC5S ofRSD Is

ckpendClll on two key IISSUIIlpllons tqllll\llng111 t)-pieal SYN flooding GilliCk:

• The: SYN p.1Ckcts lul\-e l'lllldomly spoofed source II' oddn:sscs.
•

The: rundomly spoofed source II' nddn:sscs do not foil ''illlin the source network

sub net

Undet 110mutl tml11c eoillllllons. oiilgolng SVN p;;.ekcts \\ill be atc:omp:mled by o
RSPOndi!lll SYN·ACK pocket \\ithln one round-trip lime (Figure S). llowan. If llu:
SYN packets hii\'C spoofed

50\IJ'CI!

IP nddn::sscs. the victim scnn will RS}lOnd to tin:

spoofed addn:ss. IUid !he RSD mccb:lnlsm \\ill IIC\'Ct ~
I~~Mnsistency bc:t\\'I:CIIthe

tit~

JUclrclS. Thm:fore. an

number of SYN ~kets omlthc number ofSYN·ACK (13Ckcts

would iiiiiiClllc o possible attock. Unfortunotoely. under normnl lnlffic conditions there Is
RO perfect ODe-lCHIDC COITC3)!0ncfmtc bct\\'CC:II ~ (13Ckets.

The most CUIIIDHill I'C:IIJODS

for this~pnncy nrc ns follo\\'s (42).

• The TCP scn'Ct n:cclvingthc SYN request Is O\"CTioadcd and Is unnblc to rcl'll)'

\\itb II SYN·ACK p4Ckct.
•
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•

Tho link bo:t\\-mt tho c:Uwt and scn'CT Is c:onges1ed, c:liUSing lhc S YN n:quc:ssto
be dtoJIIICd. Sil= lhe TCP ac:n'CT nevc:r rcteivcs the SYN n:quc:ss. no SYN·ACK

p;u:kc:t Is sm~:rutc:d.

As a rc:sult, RSD c:mmol Uc:tcct n SYN Ooodlng nnnck simply "l~ma dlffcnna: between

the nwnbc:r ofSYN and SYN·ACK packets is obscn'l:d. lnsltDd. RSD moniloJS lhc rt11io
of SYN to SYN·ACK Jllll:kcts and signals an llllllek wbm an abrupl cb:lnge of this

varillblc is obsc:rvc:d. uslng an adapth-c tlm:shold mc:tbod lmnl on trmious raliD
mcasun:mc:nts. Slmll111ly. SYN-dog (42) monitoiS

tl~c:

nonnaliud diffauKX

bd~'CUI

SYN and SYN·ACK patkcts and uses 11 non·p:1f11111Ciric: Cumullllh-c: Sum cCUSUM)
mctlwd 147) to indiCIIIc an 11tlllek.

Under typic:al conditions. the: numba of SYN and SYN·ACK pxkcu is stnmgly
correlated. ind~pc:ndcnt of SlltDplc: t~ Jite. andtiJnc.of-iby. Tl'llffic IDCCS Jllll)lcrcd 111 a
stub nci\\'Ork' s connection to tl~c: lntcrru:l wm: obulinro and mmlyzul. "ilh the n:suhs
slt0\\11

In Ogun: 6. Figure 63 ICJI~Is 11 one: hour ll'llCC of all truffic: h:tuun lhc Digital

Equlpmmt Co~mtlon and tltc lntc:rnc:l on March 8. 1995. Fi&lll'C 6b ICICcscnts a one:
holD' true of all truffic: bo:t\\l:Cll tho Ul\ncncc Octi.'Cic:)' IAbonllory nnd lbo: llllemC:l on
January 21. 1994. Note that tiiCIC Is a strong coml4tion bc.t\\l:Cll SYN :md SYN·ACK
patkc:IJ. but there is no onc:-to-onc rcllltio:nsltip.

,_.

{D)

--

{b)

Agun- 6: S\'N Dnd S\'N-ACK puli~t wunts nt Ol:C{D) Dod I.Bl(b)
During an niilltk. spoofed SYN jl:ICkets will b.: obsm·aJ nt the leaf rnuK..- but the number
of SYN-ACI\. pack.:ts uill n.:m:1in rdath·cly unclmngal. since the victim \\; II be ~ding
the responding S''N-ACK jl:ICkcts to the S('IOOfcd II' nddn:ss. As a n:sull.. the diiTen:nce
bt:tuccn SYN Md SYN-i\CK packets \\ill

incfi.":ISf,

iltllic:ntlng n possible nuock.

llowc-·.:r. ,,..: c:umot in fa an lllllltk by simply using the diiT.:rt:ntt: ns our me-.ssun:nu:nt.
lntanct tra.ffie u·ill '1111' lkrroding on n number of fw:tors. including time of llny und
I)'JIC

of users. nltll a nonn:1l incn:ns:c in ll'llffiC lood lllll)' also lc:ad to WI lncl'l:'.ssc In the

diiT.m:na: bc:tW\.~ SYN nltll S''N·ACK Jlackets. For e\wnpk. o.uumc one out of C\'t:r)'
Ibm: TCI' &:Onncctions n:quin:s o n:tmnsmission of the ~sinning SYN Jlatkct due to one

of 1hc: rwo £xun mmtiono:d c:ulia'. If an edge routc:t rccs 30 new TCP tOIIIICCtlom
"ill

10 more SYN JDCkcts llliiJ1 SYN-ACK p;ackcu

C'\'CI)'

mimuc 11xn 1hc:

11:\'CI)'

mjmne ll0\\'1:\'a. if an edge roUICr cxpcritoeeJ D bum of high tmffic IUld lhc:tc on:

rou1cr

SCI:

60 De\\' TCP c:ono«tions 11:\'CJ)' minwe, then 11JC diJTen:ntc between SYN IUld SYN·ACK
pxkds \\ill be 20. O!r.iously. 1hc: locn:1sc in the diJT~ docs

001

indiCllle ao DliDI:k.

bul is 11 dirccl rault of \'IU)iog llllffic p.1llCmS.

In on1c:t to make anxk cktcctioo less scnsiti\-e to \'llf)ing uumc
1hc:

roJ/o

p;~ucrs.

RSD monitors

bctu-=n SYN IUld SYN-ACK p;IC.kcts at tiJC edge roulcr. The lllgorithm for

dclcaing an IIUDd: is rclath-ely SlJ111&htfon''lU'Ii and Is o l)'fll: of Cld.olpth-c threshold

olgorilhm. It teSts wbctbc:t a gi\'CD truffic IJlC:I.SUtallCI the ratio of SYN to SYN·ACK
pxkl:\s in 0111' CIISIC. ac=ds ll sctlhrc:shoJd i11 D tcnoln linu:! inlcn'IIJ.
is colcuWcd

usi:ns

n:a:n1

Tile tJu~boJd \'liiUc

lr.lfllc mcamrcmcnts 10 111ll1:c the olgoritlun DJIJllicnblc 10

differing IJllffic conditions.

3.3 RSD Drtllll.s

Let

n .. 50111Ciimc imcn'lll dt
ondld

R. • #S111'·ACK ~hts In lnJcrrol n I AS1N padrts In lnJum/ n.
Tbm R., < I and should be dose to I due to the com:Jntlon of SYN and SYN·ACK
p:ICkrts. WIICn

GO

ll1lliCk ocxws. tlJC nwnbcr of SYN p;!Ckcts \\ill lnt:rc4SC! while the

number ofSYN·ACK p;!ClTls \\ill SlD)' lhc sum. n:sultlng in o dcacose of R., During
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the dcl.cction pJwc. RSD c:nlcullucs

R. for C\'a)' time inlm'lll AtiWI signals an ll11lll:k

when

R. :!: (a• 0.11
\\'bc:rt a is some \'Ul~

bctWIXII

0 IUid I IUid is our thn:shold vnriablc and

opproxim:nc lliC3II \'Ul~ of tl~e Jml n·l

IDCl.SUI1:Jill!fllS

o../ is M

of R. 0. Is c:nlc:ulllled using an

cxponmlinlly \\'cishtcd mo~ing O\"CJ'ilgc function

O. • p(O.u + O·PJR.

wbcreO < P< I is Lhe c:.qJOncntially \\'ciglllc:d mavins ;m:rogc foetor.

Tlu: llln3blc \'llriablcs in this algorithm include a.

p. and tJt. "l1ll: followins sections

dispm Lhe eiTcas of altering these \uri!lbles.
3.3.1 Varying a

a n:pn:scrus tiiC thn:shold IC\'cl for indicating a DDoS attack. Oy increasins a. RSD
becomes more sensith~ to small fluctlllllions in R. and results in o higher probability or
IIIIliCk dctcctlon along with

11

Wglter number of false posith-es. Dy dCCI1:l1Sing a. RSD

becomes more immune to false posith-es but only signals attacks If the SYN flood rotc is
'-.:1)" hish-lhcn:by dcc.rc:a5ins

its dfcctlvo:ness. Tiuougl1 initiul trinl·Wid-error. a i.s set to

0. 7 in RSD in M attempt to balrulcc n low false
etrec:til-encss.

2S

positil~

rotc \lith

Q

high degree or

3.l.l \ 'U)ilrl:,

p ICJWC!SUIIS ihc o"J'ODCII1.i.:Uiy un~ mo~ingll\'elllgc fiiCUlr lllld lku:nnlncs how much
wcisf:\ is

sn1:n

10 (QSl iilCJSUIClllCII

comjW'L'd

10

llu: current mmsun:mcnl wbm

alcu.1.:lliu£ tiE mo\ins lll'elll£"- A hisb ''lllw: ofPsmooibes out the moving o\-cr.ag.: O.
111111 m:;lb:$ illa.s Sl&SCql&ibl..: 10 llboonm1 iDQSW'CiilaUS of fl.. A low \'lllut of P\\ill pUI
more u'Cisbl on

cum:n1

masumncn" and \\lll odjUSI O. qu.itkcr In response to lnrgc

dmlscs in fl.. Silltt inlmlct lr.IITic is t)Jiic:ally \'cry bursty on o sl1on Limc:senlc and
slouiy ''llr)ing on o tons •imcsc!le

Pis ini1inlly set 10 0.91n RSD.

J.J.J\'~<11

.JI itpc:sc:tllS tiE tim.: lntcr\111 (in ~ds) th:u RSD " ill usc ''ben dct~tins S''N

Oooding ailiX:ks.. h iilio rcprescn1S llu: minimal llllllt"k detection time. a.s RSI> can only

lbg :m lllL:I.Ck nftcr CKh tim.: intcn'lll is complelC. As sw:h. dc1cnnining an opunul ,·aJuc
for tJI is ''CI)' impottanJ for soocJ pafomuncc of RSD. If .JI is too small, RSD ,,;n not
<:a signi.fic:ml number ofS''N and S' , • •CK p;ICkrts during c:sch inlm11l. resulting in

A bi[:h fllse posili\"C nuio (FPR. or
pcrform::mt~:.

ldc:ill~·.

/Jfaln~

prullhv In

11

/mmwls I 11) and poor

As dl inacascs. lb.: FJIR d~ Ill the expmsc: of attock dctccllon lim.:.

we would like for RSD 10 be Doble to dct~t S''N Oooding attacks In the shortCSI

tiro · posst'ble \\it.h o FPR ofO.Inn clc:uly IIi tmdeoff c:rists bct\\«n these two goo.ls. 1lu:
oat section \\ill cxploJC this lr:ldeoffin src:ucr lkta.il.

3.3.4 RSD TnalniDJ;I\Iodulc
An optiDml ''llluc of dl \\ill rcsull in quid o.uod: detection time \\itb the lowi:SI fo.ls.:

positi•'t' r:ne (FPR) possible. Dctmnininglil good \'lllue for dr Is also \'U)' dependent on
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~

tnffu: p:mcms. C'\'Cil mo~ su IbM a IUld p. For ins~. 11 good ill for 11 large stub

network
\':11).

m;~y

n:sult in extmncly poor pafol1llllllcc in 11 smallc:r stub network. liS R. can

,,;Jd)y \\'ben ill is 100 small10 ~~CCUJt~uiOIC 1111 adcqu:uc number of SYN nnd SVN·

ACK pxkc:u in the tinu: intm111. nlis same problem can occur on the same stub
~llrl.: ,,.ben tnffu:

module: is

~

f13I1c:111S '"lliY dut" 10 tinu: of dlly Ouctu:llions. As 11 result. 11 training

10 c:usaomizc: .dt for

~rut app.lic:~~tion

in a spc:c:ific: lll:'twork

cmironmau. nUs training plwc is do~~~: offiinc: nnd \\ill result in nn optillllll .dt.

Offiitu: training is done \\ith a typiCIII truflic uuce obtained Ill llu: edge: routc:r wh~ RSD

,,;u be deployed.

h is IISSUillc:d th3! thls uuce does not contnln liD). SYN flood nti.Otks.

nUs is important.

11.!1

it implies th3! nny atllleks c:nusJu by RSD c:nn be considcn:d folsc

positives. lluougb simulation. difTc:mat \111111:5 of d t c:nn be set in RSD nnd the algori~ml

can be npplied multiple: times 10 ll1e tr.tllit uuce. c:ac:h time Clllculllling tlu: false positi\1:

r:uio (FPR). 8asc:d on thc::sc simulations. nn optimal value of d t is then chosen. TI1c
rc::sults of appl)inll RSD on the DEC olDd LBL uuce:s \\ith d t '"lll)ing bctwren I nnd 30
:sc:cnnds is sho\\n in lil!llfl: 7 below.
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fi::,ln 7: ElfKb of ,..,La:~ et DECt•J•ad LBL(b)

.lt ·~ "

10 .annck for thr DEC nt'!Uod and .W for ~ I.DL odnorl...

The

thr ~ m SY S :md SYN -ACK IJ:lffic. Tk DEC trxr Ius much more SYS and
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'' LC) fc:11w-c of RSO is the Dhilit)' 10 o;bpt In chrtnlli"ll tmffic coruJition.. 11•i~ i•

achi.:o. C\1 by \'lii);ng

~

t.l)nnmirolly. in onkr to w:hic\'t' our goal of fll>lllllack t.lctt'Ciion

(lou All ui tb a lou fl'R. 1'1:> mrnlionC\1 c.wlit'f. trufllc conditions m:J)' fluctuntc t.luc 10
fxtors such ns time of !by or l)"f'C of u.sc:r. lllld

11>

a rc:sult Ill nmy become less thnn

OJUil11lll. To iltbit'\c ad4J111lbility. RSD lim C31cuwes a nC'\\ \'Diuc. liSA. fur
t.lirf~nl

AI usa! in the truining pi13S.:.

C'\(1}'

II,S-1 b 1l1c «pon.::ruiall)' ''di!IIIC\1 mm·ing

a\ cruse of the nWllb<:r of SYN·ACK p.:ldit'l• in C'IICh At. lntuilh·cly. It fC'JIII:$Cnl~ the
Figu~

l)l'iml amount of SYN-1\ C.:K tr.tflic in cu;h At.
HsriC\1 from I to JO S«<ods on the DEr lr.IC'C:.

A~

R shows liS:I

"''Jl«lcd. uhcn

~>c

\ 'DlUL"S

\\hen AI

IS

incrc:1>c Ill. more

SYN-ACK p:sdcu arc obSCI'\C\1 per time intcr\111

•

"-

t

t-

1-

}·

i:

•

------

..../

Aflt'f nn OJIIim:l.l ~ is chosen I 10 seconds in Ihe C'llSc o f the DEC llllC'C:I. RSD 5:1\ cs tlu.~
rom::sponding liS.-! \'Diuc lllld stores it into a nt'\\' \'Orinblc. S.·l~. For til~ DI:C lmcc. S.4•.,.. •
::: (tl SYN-ACK packets. It is important to remember that .s-1•.,.. is set oOcr the tmining

plwc is romplctcd lllld is not cllllllsC\J &.luring nornml operat ion orRSD.
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Duringll1c detection phase. RSD compc."':S &I"" to the obscm:d number of SYN·ACK
packets (IIS,I) in cnch tlt.

n~e

follo\\ing pseudo code liiUSlnllcs

ll~e

bc:lloll\ior of RSD

during c~~~:h time intcn'lll:

If 11&1 <&I.,. then
lncn:asc dt by 2.r 5CCOnds
Else if 11&1> &l.... thcn

Decrease dt by x 5CCOnds

\Vbm: x con bc: \Uricd dcp:nlling on bow quldly

\\"r

would like RSD to ad:apt 10

changing troffic conditions. xIs set to I second in ti!U implcmcnt:lllon in onlcr 10 l.:eep Jt
Slllbic O\'CJ' the long run.

Using this slmplc test at c~~~:b time intmul nllows RSD to adjust d t d}n:nnic:Uiy in onJcr
10

keep II close to optimal. ror e.wnpk. If o n:duttion in lr.lffic Is ob:scn'cd by RSD

(indlcot~'ll by u n:duttion in lite numbaofSYN·ACK p;~Cktts).ll!Cn RSD ,,;nina= dl

in onlcr lo incn:asc lite number of S\'N·ACK p:~ekcu lllCOSIII\:d per lime intm111. This
\\ill keep tlu: rPR from bc:comlng too IMgc. Concwmll.l)•. If on incrtosc in uuffic: is
ob:scn'cd tl1cn RSD \\ill dcti'Cl!SC dt In onlcr to keep om dc:tccllon tinlc

possible.
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liS

Sl1\llll

liS

•

To •ho11 ch.: dTcca of \urylnll lmmc rondiaions on lh~ Fl'ft If we 11c:rc ro u.c a sialic
111luo: of <ll. anochcr lrorc Nilccacd ol lh~ DH' sir~ 11us run c.hroug.h 11~ 1nunin11 rlw.sc.

Tlc1> •me~. lilbclcd L>I:C-~ .

·-

"liS

~:uJarrcd four hooD prim 10 lhc un guml 01£ lmce
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. . _:;,
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I'IJ:UI'\' 9: EIT~CIJ of\ Dl') ln11 AI on llEC- 1 and DEC·l

From J111un: ~. 11c cnn sec 11101 lhc orclnwl <ll for DEC<! willlx: longer 1han lhc orcim.cl
<ll for DEC-I . Tlcis is due 10 chc lo11cr ttmounl ofSVN-ACK cmfllc in I he DEC-~ lmt'c.

u.' slcu1111 In ll11un: IU.

FIJlUI"l' 10: ,\\(1'111!( numbu ofS\'N-,\ C K pack(IJ obwn'fd In uch Ill for DEC·I
and DEC· Z
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\'aluc oT ru. ano1l1cr trace collected at the DEC site was run through the training phase.

This trace. labeled DEC-2. was gathered four hours prior to the original DEC trace
(labeled DEC'-I ). Figure 9 shows the effects of varying ru on both the DEC·I and DEC·2
traces.

Ol

_-------==]
0

!0

l\

Figure 9.: Effects of varying l!!.t on DEC-I and DEC-2

From figure 9. we can see that the optimal

ru for DEC-2 will be longer than the optimal

!lJ for DEC-I . This is due to the lower amount of SYN-ACK traffic in the DEC-2 trace.

as shown in figure 10.

""!

From figure 9, we can see that the optimal Ill for DEC-2 will be longer than the optimal

ru for DEC-I . This is due to the lower amount or SYN-ACK traffic in the DEC-2 trace.

-

as shown in figure I0.
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Figure 10: A,·erage number ofS\'N-ACK packets obsen·ed in each ru for DEC-I
andDEC-2
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Clc:lrly. if \\c llli\'C llllincd RSD on the DEC·I

uu.:.:. Ibm a &llllic

voluo of ill (10

scamds) ,,;11 result in a hlgiiCf Fl'R whm llllmc .:ondilions 5Udl os In DEC·211nl pn:san.

'lllmf~J~e. in the ose of ~s llllf11c IOO!d (I.e. DI!C-1 10 DI!C-2). RSD will
incrt::lse the lime intm'lll in onkr to tmSIII'C a. low I'I'R. In .:onllllSI, when the uuffic lo:ul
is incrcosing ( i.e. DEC·2 10 DEC·I), RSD ''ill dca= thc time lnim'lll, whid1 \\ill
n:sull in 11 lower DI!Dd iltt«lion lime. Slnt.e malmninlng a low• I'I'R is mon:imi'Onmtl
llwa ensuring the lowest possible iltt«lion tim~ RSD \\ill i~~C~C~SC ill by 1z instc:Dd of :r.

This will kttp <11 slishlly larger 11Win«US4ly In thc Ions run.
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CIIArn:R -1: RSD IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
ln onlcr ID iln'CSl.iGJile lhc dl'ICI&:)' or RSD.
pcrf'ormcd. Truffic lniCC:S "~ oblllincd

II

manba or ~'a! dmul4tioos

rrom abc

link

~ling '''v

\\CI'C

sitcs Ut the

lll1a1XC lhc DiGiiAI Equipmcn1 CCII'pOT.IIlon and lhc l...lm'R'.IICC Dakcky LllbollllOI)' 148).

Table 2 ~ lhc p:nincna infOI'IIllllion Rpl'lling the collceled ll'llCr:s.

Follo"in& tht mc1bodology p=tcd In the J'TC'ious S«tlon. the RSO !mining
\l.'llS pcrf'ormcd

Fi~

rJwc

for cxh of 1M indilidu:lllr.loi::S 1D dctcrmlnc optinul d t ODd s..t..,. \'lllUCS.

II sbo"'S lhc n:sults or lhis !mining (lhasc. and ublc 3 slwws the ~lting oplimal

\...Uuc:s cbosm (or ClclliCSJlCCth-c lrXll:.
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R~oll1

from RSD 1nlnln11 pllllU" an DEC (a land LDL (b ) lrac:'t'\

lllAC1. NA\11

orr"'•'L Ill,...,,

5:1- t ruilil. l'<f Ill I
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Ull-r,.r- ~
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10~
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Tab~ J: Oplhul '•••~ for RSD far diiTtn-nllnru

Tobit' 3 illustr.:ucs 1hc

tm~

of Ihe !ruining rlwc- for orlimnl

lniti:ll ' llluo for ill cnn ran~c from

J>erfum~

of RSO.

''f) sllon inlmah. cu in the DEC-1'1\T-3 I~ 110

sec). lo long intmuh. as tn lhc LOL-1'1\T-S (~S s«l. Clcarl) . a siDitc ,,due for Ill \\ Ill
not pnl\ 1\k OJ'ILIII:l) Jtafo~ for \111)ing lraffit rondtlions 1111\1 111:1) ~ull 10 0 high

FrR or mlucal lllllldi llcla:tlon time. llcpclllling on cornlhioiU.

'

h is 1\lso impon:mliO DOle: the ~ bet"'~ opl.imAI
sik. RA=11 lh:d RSD ..;u d}n:vniaDy

\"llr)'

\'li!UCS

of Stf.,. "'ilh.ln each

dt b:lsed on the numbo:r of SYN-ACK

pxl·rts obsc:r\'C:d ta lime int&:n'lll (i.Sd). In dfccl. RSD is adjU5lins .dt in onkr 10 ~

iS.h ppro:Dm:udy dose 10~ llll:c:ondlllion bct"'~s...._ ''lllucs ( (99.91. 1021 for
the DEC siiA:: (25.281 for the l.Dl Ale) sbou:slh:u RSD will (11'0\ick optim:1l ddection
('U

in the lila or ~ins tr:lffic amditions.

r- Clalll1)lk. IIS5UI1lC lh:u RSD is ll':linal

on DEC-PO-l :md bq;ins the dc1«tiool plmc "'ilh 41 • 23 and SA,...

a

99. If llllffic

anfrtiom cb:msc 10 tbosc cinn1.,. in DEC-PJ..I-2. qxldcnly 41 bcconu:s las t1mn

opritml
appu

In Ibis = . RSD ";u sa: lh:d W >

I .......

S.~.,..

and "ill ~ 41 until il.\:1

s.-t_ rcsultins in 1111 optimal m (umcb is Is in Ibis ~).

To ,-crify Ibis ob:scn111ion. the RSD uaiaing pb:l.sc

' "liS nm on DEC-Pk"T-1

and 1m

\mObles u"Ce used uilcn nmllins sinnWiliODS on DEC-Pt."T-2 (m "' 23 and Stt.,. "' 99).
As cxpcctcd. RSD d)mmiClllly lldjiiSI.cd tlt by fl"lhhc:ing it siDtt 11 d t \'lll~ of 23 n:sultcd

in R&1 bc:int; pc:lll:r t1mn S..f..,.. dl uus obscn'Cd 10 llpJinl:lcb its optinmJ •'llluc of 15
....,.,. in liJijliUSim:ilcly 10 int&:n"llb. The com:lalioo bctu1:Cll S.of.,. \'nlucs wilhin the

DEC site: c:mun:d lh:u the: d}mmic bcb:l\ior of RSD b:pt .Jt optimal.

ODa: the uaiaing plmc U'liS complete. simnW.ed mtnch \\'tl'e insatcd into lbc 1n1te5 lll.ld
the RSD nlplrilhm's lll1:ICk dclcc:tion ~y ·u:zs cxplon:d. All nnncb bc:gan 10
miiiil•ts

into the IIlia: :md bsted for I 0 minutes

3S

Accntdins to [44), Ibis is the typiC!I

.t.l DEC <Wk realu

liDil the 3btlit~ of the RSD ai~'Orilhm 1o romxtly idallil)•ananad. condition. The ....a,is
rqm::.cnb

.filTering SYN an:xl. OoodJns

r1l1o

41·:!0 SYN p:u:Lel> res i«<ndJ. lltc )'·

antcoul.i.. RCCIII th:u tUI >'UllUbtaliJillllel> l.:tsl for 10 minuld. lhut in the c::mc of DEC·

RSD

\lollS

wmbl.: to drtiXI an anad: 10 out of 60 intm-ulsJ

~>lldl

a rotc of less than 10

sn: rucl.cu ra !<COOII~>as insmoJ into DEC-PKT·l .
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16 intervals) when the SYN flood rate reached 6 SYN packets per second. fn contrast.
RSD wos unable to detect an attack (0 out of 60 intervals) when a rate of less than I0
SYN packets per second was inserted into DEC-PKT-3.
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Fi~

13 llho''C.' .bow" lhc diO~ bct\\ccn lhc: nonn:ll lruffic uuccs a.nd lhc lrutd

lllltrolingly. in the: C3SC of OEC-I'KT-3. RSO detects

1 00:~

r.uc is S'QJCT limn ZO SYN (U('ko:IS p:r scrood.

rnucll his)JU ~mp.=U to DEC·

Pt..l-1, uhcrc RSD lkt«ta~
second. Tiu£

IS

I OO" a of a

Tim

1$

of a SYN Oooc.l "hen the

SYN noo.J \\hen lht nile "as 6 SYN rud<cb per

due 10 the di ITmng II'Dffic rondiliOJU p=t in the

I\\ o

tmcc:s. i\ SYN

Oooc.l iJ. h:lnl.:r 10 dCICCI ubro lhac: is a !lfCl!CT amount of background lmffic since il i>
CISiCT Cor the: rul:ld; padct>

10

blend io \\i lh nomcl lr.lffic. In tlus cn.se. successful

dda:tlon or a SYN flood n:qutn:s o hi!;lta mJe or anacl> pac.~cb romp.=U 1o a lo\\

1r.11Tu: sc-cnzuio. Figun: 14 conlirm.~ thi.s obsco ution b) pn:srotins o com!'3riwn bct\\ccn

lht lr'DJTic niles

Ill

lhc DEC

•He

II sho""> that the DEC-I'KT-3 lmtc has much mo~

1r.11Tu: lh:ul tht DEC-Pt..l-1 t = , \lohich

apl:un~ II h)

RSD em pitl. up allacks 11ith

lo,.crSYN flood niles in DEC-I't..l-1.

-aL-------------------------------------1
• : i i i s ~ i i ! s! ! I ! § i l e! ~ 1 l ~ t : £ sI i

--

Figurr 1-&: Campuboa or tnaffic: natrs al DEC 1llr
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Re.ulb from •tmublal Nib of RSD oo ttl< LDL trxo ~ iho~>n in ftl!urc 15. Frum

r.11c

:11

the algt' mula

In 1h1> c:::au-. lhl" LDL ~ ronlllin
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4.3 DbtttSS!OD
Tl~e

pn:vious sections lum: shown how 11 t)'JIIc:Jl

lmplc:~~Knllllion

of RSD will perform

using l.nlec-Urlvcn slmulaJions. Oalli IJlllhc:n:tl from thc:s.: simulllllons lw sbO\m lhc
imponnncc of OJ11lmlzing dt through the usc of on offiine 11lllning J1lwc:. Tllis enables
RSD 10 quickly detect on attock \\ilhout Incurring o high false posith•e lllle.

Tlw prc:scncc of \'Orying ll'llffic rotc:s \\US oho

alt0\\11

to have one of 1\\'0 efTcc:ts on lhc

pcrfonnonce of RSD: on lncn:asc In the I'I'R or a suboptlllllll (too large) mlnlllllll

detection time. Tltcsc effects Ill\: mltlGJUcd in RSD by d)'namltillly adapting Lit lmcd on
curmll

1111ffic condllions. Tltis ~ ortlllllll pcrfoltllliiiCC of the dctc:ction engine in

the rm:s.:ncc of long•term \'Wtlons In traffic p:tllcms.

fln:dly, tiiC cfTcc:th·cncss of RSD \\UJ shownlhrough the usc of simulated ottnck ll:la:S.
ond (!Crformoncc data \\US gatlu:n:d. based on the minimum SVN Oootl mtc which results

In a I00% nllnck dctcclion rate. It \\llJ found that traffic rate, agnln. plays a key role In
this metric. Lower background troffic rotcs make It easier to detect smnll mtc: SYN

floods since lite ottnck ll'llffie is more anomalous. Conrum:ntly, when larger bxkgnnmd
llllffic rates nrc rrc:scnt. higher SYN Oootl llllc:s nrc rcqulml to successfully detect on
Dttnck.

4.3.1 S\'N·IIog CompArison
Wong ct a!. (421 hn\'C prc:scntcd n simllnt solution to RSO cnllcd S\'N~og. Dolh tnl.'C
aU\'lllllnQ\:

of tl11: com:lntlon bct\\un SYN ntul SYN·t\CK p:~tkets to detect DDoS

40

uses a Cumnlmh'l: Sam (CUS\JM) DXIbod to deled SYN flood lll'nch l1l1hcr ttwl AD
lllbpfi\'1:

thn:sbold mcthod.

•

•• mxy (less

~

~

liS

in RSD. This n:suiiS in

posim-cs) in SYN.OOS. at

11

the~

sli!J}uly higha degree of

of a longer dcltttlon time.

posimu CODlj:W:td to SYN-dog. This is :m DCCqJIIIbk tr.ldcoff for adlie\ing our

£Oll of fnsl ddmion timc. \\hidl S\"N-dot! lldW:\"CS.

S\"N~ docs 1101

fcnun: D tmining pluse to optimiu 4 1 liS in RSD. The DU1hors of (42)

simply set iJJ to 20 scamd.s. tbm:by limi!lns tbe minimwn dda:tion time to l.his \uluc.

d},. uuir '"Y adjust !h: time ink:nul llurins c:x=ion. This allows RSD to krtp lhe

minim.! IJWII:k detcctioo time 4S sm:illa.s possible. nom smnllc:r tban SYN-IIog in some
c::ISlCS.

Fer c:x:amplc. in !h: asc: af liD= OEC-PIIT·) wllk milt. RSO fc::uun:s a minimum

dcl&:c:tion time of 10 seconds due to !be tmining phase.

The llbilit)' of RSD to dyn:micilly adjust .It m:IL:s it mon: sc:nc:raJiy applicnble to some

ncrwod: C11\i:nmmaus cvttiJI'IIdl to SYN-dog. espcci.a.Jiy in low trnffic: situ:uions. In
lhcsc cmcs. SYN~'s SU!ic intcn'ill of20 s=mdJ DillY IIIli be: cnougb time to oblllin an

l!dcqu:w: lllCliSUll:lllC of SYN·ACK p;~tkcts. wbic:b Cll1 rcsul! in a W~ folsc: posith'l:

au:. For c:mmple. i( only 10 SYN·ACK. JE'dds were: seen in a single intc:r\'111, then a

sinsJc missins SYN pxkcl would sa:m p;utic:ulatly anomnlous. pos.slbly rc:sultins In an
ldllltk rnndjJion. l'.losa likdy. this sing.le missins j'Qtl:d would not lndicntc llll 111111tk.
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ConliiiSIIbls to the asc "~ 100 SVN·ACK JRCkdaaK obtcn'Qia lk same SYN
J)Y.kct 1.1 mWlna. In Ibis CIISC. llll lllllllmloua condi•ion 111l1Uld IIIII be abJcnul. RS0
lllnu for the lllna CIISC by d)llllllllclllly adjustlna tft to lhc number ofSVN·AC'K prdd•

obscn'l'\1 per tlmc illlnl'lll 1.1 close 10

orWmJ.

WbiJc tbis

liD)'

result ill • blp:r

minimum dructlon time. it Jlf'OVidc:s o wc.21cr dcpa: of ICQIIX')' and makes RSD marr
eiTc:ctl\'1: O\'l:f o \\ide r;mgc of nct\\ork cn\ironmmb.

Similar 10 RSD. the efficxy of SVN-dog b C'Q!IIinnd iD (42) mill; rra:c~trn'CII
llmub.tloru. The I'C$Ulu ~R c:oosi<lm! •ith those found from sjmg!•ims mill; RSI>Iaria Rood Ina r.JJa lc:xl 10 Win liDd c:Wcr ddcaioo of anec:b ..S detcaion b IIIUdl

more aensitl\'1: In the prc:sencrofa lo\o a \'Oiumeo(tnfllc..

CllAI'TER 5: API'LJCADILITV OF RSD TO NETWORK PROCESSORS
As co1-.:ml In section 2.. nctwo1k processors (NI's) havo bcl:n developed lo provide hiJ:lh·

speed

p;~Cket

fe~~turo

processing 11ith tile Ocxlbllity of 11 JlroQtlllMlllb!c an:biteclurc:. A kc)•

of RSO Is ha ability to u)1llUlllcally adapt to changing tmffic coru.lhlons. n!IJ

requires on-tbc-Oy cnlailinlons which will rt:SU!t In chAnges in the behavior of :'.SO.

Additionally, RSO n:qulro offline tl'lllnlng to oplimlzc Its 1"11riob!cs. which then na:U to
be JlfOg1l~Illli~etllnto the dcvkc. CICDJI)'. network ptOC\!SSOT5 may provide RSD 11ilh the
= s a t )'

plotfonn for 11 5111:ccssrlll1111d cfficlcntlmplcmcntotion. Nl's Clll1 gh-c RSD lite

Ocxibilh>· to modify Its bcluwlor wbl!c still mnintolnlng line-speed rmkcl )l'rOa:SSing.
ntis section will c..'Cplon: the opJlliCIIbllhy of RSO on a nrtii'Oik pt"OCCSSOr tiiTOugh the usc

of a NP simulotor.

5.1 Slmu!lltor
ntc simulator used for pc:rformancc testing of RSD Is b:ucd on the Simp!cScalar toolkit

(SOJ lllld Is dcsll!llcd to n:JITCSCnt the an:hltcctun: lllld pcrfOnDIIIlCC of till: Intel
DCIWOik JlTOCCSSOI QS shOI\11

In ligun: 17. nu: simulator gh'CS

0

rxr 1200

user the ability to

simulate o generic out·of·onler supcrscnlor. lAking t111: role of tlu: StrongARM processor
tllld the 6 mlcrocnglncs. Clldl Ofllhldl rontoJns 4 COIIlCXt•SIIitchobJe tilrCIIds for p;x:kct

processing. Suppon for C-++ objccts lw nlso bcl:n added to tl1c simulator tc> I~ hs
Ocxlbllity nnd =of usc.
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f"!p"' 17: lattl LXP I ZOO Ardllt«tun lfnnai.&9Jl

5.2 t.pktacutatJoa Rcm.lu

The RSD nlgorilhm
mc:1am w."~~~•

U.'CJ'C:

\\US

imrlo:mcntal in lhc

simnln1or

aDd simple

pc~fOntWII"

coUo:cta! to m\utipu: lhc twit fe:asibiliry of running RSD on a

oerwork pt.'+ '-csor.

For ccmp;uisoo purposes. 11 lnsclinl: irorlanc:nwioa of simple routc:r functlonmlit)• ",..
complctc:d IIDI.I que collli1S

'''ell: coii!Xl~ using lhe DEC-PKT·I

\rot'!:.

1k twdine

implnnmsmioo simply p;II'SC$1hc ,lcstiwion IP address fidd of c:xl1 p3Ckd lind 51ores it

iDio 111empor.zry itn.cmnl \Wble. In a fuiJy functioning roilier. 11 rollllnll mblt lool.'Up
u.-ould be pcrfonncd using !.his dotin:uion IP Dddrcss GOd Olllgoing inlcrfocc: informmtioo
u.-ould be obo•inn1 but for lhc JlUl1'0SCS of !his ill\'$iJlillion 11 n:fetct~~Cr tydc: COWll b nil
tim is .,.,.led Resultt fmm lhc baseline: ~~an: shown in figun: 18 11).

.

·I

IQiche
·! 16K8

DCache
11:.8

Mini

,

DCacbe

F igure 17: Intel JXP 1200 Architecture (from 1491)

5.2 Implemcnh1tion ncsults

The R ·v algorithm was impkmt:nh:d m the simu lator and simple pertom1.' ~\.'

~

RSD Algorithm wcu then implcn=Jcd and

C)'C~

count d41ll

"'DS

collcell:d dwing

nms using tiM: DEC·P~I· IInlCI:. In the c:JSC of this trocc. offilne trulnlng \\'DS performed
111111 Jt \\'liS sd to I 0 scmcub.

The RSD AlGOrithm Rquircs that cnch p:ldct be ilupcl:ted 10 dcu:rmine If It Ls a TCI'

SYN or TCP SYN·ACK pxkct.. '' hidt Rquirc:s lmpcttion o f the TCI' flags field In the
TCP bcldcr. This fuoctionotlity

\\'DS

lllldo.l

10

the baseline lmplancnmti.on arul the

diiTcrcncc in C)'l:lc count ''m c:nlc;u141etl to dctCJ11llm the cost of the new functlnnality.

Results shom:d tbal lht: cost of in.sp«ting thc TCP flags flcld and lnui!llltllti11g the
IIJlll!Oprink counter 11111gcd from II to I 5 cycles per p;lCkct.. dqlcrullng on the l)l!C of

pxkrl and the \'lllu.c: in tlu: TCP flo11 field. Results arc: altO\\n in flgW'I: 18 (2). Titls
IC)Qc::sents an oppro.,imDtc.ly

Next.

w

I pcrttnl iJlCI'CISC in tollll C)'l:ic cow11.

cost of c:nltul4ting the r.stio R.. updntlng

0., and chcd:Jng for an ottod

CODdilion \\'liS c\'lllWIII:d. Titesc tosks on: done C\'1:1')' dJ scoond$. nnt for

C\'1:1')'

packet

The totAl munbcr ofS"''!II·ACK rudc:lS (ilStl) Is olso comp.11'0J to &I.,.. Dl this (IOinl, arul
dl is adjusted os nc:cCSSUty to k~~l' RSD running optlmnlly.

Tite cost for lhCSil

Cll!cohnion.s and updAtes r.sngcd frum 5I to 72 cycles.. clcpcnding on the bch:l\ior of RSD.
Results arc: shown in ligW'I: 18 (3). lltis n:prescniS an odc.litional3·5 percent intrt4SC in
totAl C)'cle count.
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FJ;qn II: IUmlb FromSlmalalor. (I ) RpnKDlllalal C)drcolllll for IlK- budlnr
lmplcmuuall.oa. (:!) Rpl'DCIIlllbr addlllonal C)dn nqulnd (or tbr lnspccllon or
tbr TCP lla~:t flrld. (3) npraraiJ tbr addltlooaJ C)dn f'C1lulnd "ltrn r bcckloll for
aa anuk coodllloa.

TIJCSc n:sull3 tho~· ll'QI RSD lw o mlnim:al imJ13'= I on lltc: r-:rfonnan.."l: of a olmulatal
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Figure 18: Results From Simulator. (I) represents total cycle count for the baseline
implementation. (2) represents the additional cycles required for the inspection of
tbe TCP nags field. (3) represents the additional cycles required when checking for
a.n attack condition.
These results show that RSD has a minimal impact on the perfom1ance of a simulated
network processor when performance is based solely on cycle counts. The addition of II
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